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INTRODUCTION
On November 5, 1993, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approved Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin (rBST), also
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called Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone (rbGH), for commer-
cial use to increase milk production in dairy cattle.' The FDA de-
termined that milk from cows which have been treated with rBST
was safe for human consumption and that there was no significant
impact on the environment from the production and use of rBST.'
In February 1994 the Monsanto Corporation (Monsanto) introduced
POSILACO bovine somatotropin,3 making rBST commercially avail-
able to United States dairy farmers.
Even after 14 years of commercial availability in the United
States, the use of rBST continues to stir significant controversy with
and among dairy producers, producer-owned milk marketing coop-
eratives, dairy processors, retailers, and consumer groups. In par-
ticular, controversy arises from the finding by the FDA that there is
"no significant difference between milk from treated and untreated
cows"' in regards to labeling products derived from milk from cows
treated with rBST. Further, there is mounting attention being paid
to how to verify that cows were or were not treated with rBST. Con-
tributing to all of the recent controversy over rBST are questions
over the approval of rBST by the FDA, which may have been par-
tially responsible for the reduction of "public confidence in the
agency and increased consumer anxiety over" foods produced with
biotechnology.'
The FDA's failure to force Monsanto to devise a test to distin-
guish between the two hormones has provided grounds for challeng-
ing the FDA's decision to approve rBST for commercial use.6 The
FDA determined that a tolerance level for rBST was not required
due to the fact that "[i]t is undisputed that the dairy products de-
rived from herds treated with rBST are indistinguishable from
products derived from untreated herds."8 Taken together, questions
1. Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from
Cows That Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59
Fed. Reg. 6279 (Feb. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Interim Guidance].
2. Id. at 6279-80.
3. Biotechnology, Interim Voluntary Guidance on BST Issued by FDA for Milk Produc-
ers, Daily Rep. Exec., Reg. Econ. and Law, A (BNA) 26 (DER Feb. 9, 1994) (noting
that POSILAC was introduced following a 90-day ban following its November ap-
proval by the FDA).
4. Interim Guidance, supra note 1, at 6279-80.
5. Kristine Cerro, comment High Tech Cows: The BST Controversy, 6 S.J. AGRIC.
L. REV. 163, 192 (1996).
6. Id. at 189.
7. Symposium, Food Products Affected by Biotechnology, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 653,
677 n. 111 (1994).
8. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996).
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surrounding the approval of rBST by the FDA, the lack of a test to
distinguish between milk from treated cows versus untreated cows,
and the determination by the FDA that a tolerance level was unnec-
essary all fuel the controversy today regarding the use of rBST in
milk production.
Americans are taking increased interest in the production prac-
tices and technologies employed in the production of their food,
including irradiation, antibiotics, and hormone and pesticide use.'
Certainly, consumers are further concerned with genetic engineer-
ing of their foods,'" and the many questions which surround the use
of biotechnology in food production. In particular, consumers have
increased concern about genetic engineering processes used in food
production with foods that are fed to babies and young children."
Consumers of dairy products associate the words "wholesome" and
"pure" with the milk they purchase.'" Milk is perhaps thought of as
the most wholesome of foods and is a staple of a baby's diet, mean-
ing that consumers may be particularly sensitive to genetic engineer-
ing, which affects the milk production processes used. Retailers
selling milk labeled as "rBST-free" risk damaging the image of the
dairy products they sell and the image of the retailer itself, if the
mislabeled" milk were to be sold. "Everyone in the dairy foods in-
dustry stands to gain if the pure and wholesome image of milk is
enhanced and maintained,"" therefore, all those involved in the
dairy industry have incentives to protect the consumer perception of
milk as a wholesome and pure food. The image of the dairy indus-
9. Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr., Sociodemographic Influences on Consumer Concern for
Food Safety: The Case of Irradiation, Antibiotics, Hormones, and Pesticides, 18 REV. OF
AGRIc. EcON. 467, 467-75 (1996).
10. Diane Thue-Vasquez, Genetic Engineering and Food Labeling: A Continuing
Controversy, 10 S.J. AGRIC. L. REv. 77, 77 (2000).
11. See David B. Schweikhardt & William P. Browne, Politics by Other Means: The
Emergence of a New Politics of Food in the United States, 23 REv. OF AGRIC. ECON. 303,
312-18 (2001), [hereinafter Schweikhardt & Browne].
12. Jerry Dryer, Quality: Job No. 1 - Successful Marketing of Dairy Foods Depends on
Quality - Dryer on Marketing-Column. Dairy Foods, Oct. 1991, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m3301/is nll-v92/ai-11533635 [hereinaf-
ter Dryer].
13. "Mislabeled" may not be precisely correct, depending on the wording used
in the label. A label stating that "Our farmers promise that our milk is synthetic
hormone free," for instance, may be true. For this article, however, we will use the
term "mislabeled" to refer to milk with some sort of "synthetic hormone free" or
"rBST-free" label, when that milk either actually did come from cows treated with
rBST or came into contact with milk that had been produced using rBST and is
therefore contaminated. See infra note 59.
14. Dryer, supra note 12 at 1.
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try as a whole would likely suffer if milk labeled as rBST-free were to
be found to have come from cows that were treated with rBST.
Recently, the Kroger Company (Kroger) announced that it
would "complete the transition of the milk that it processes and sells
to a certified rBST-free supply by February 2008."'5 This decision
led to a chain of events occurring in the milk market as milk market-
ing cooperatives and individual dairy producers adjusted to meet
changing demands in milk production process attributes by Kroger.
The Michigan milk market offers a case-study style analysis for
movement towards rBST-free milk supplies, which is valuable in as-
sessing adjustments and contracting for production process attrib-
utes, not only in Michigan, but also in regions throughout the
United States.
This article examines some of the possibilities that are available
to accurately govern the production and labeling of dairy products
produced from cows not treated with rBST. Retailers may want to
initiate the use of a regulatory or third-party verification system in
order to reduce their risks associated with selling mislabeled "rBST-
free" milk. Even if states opt to specifically regulate rBST labeling,
the regulations will likely not require more than a third-party verifi-
cation system. Since regulation is unlikely to require additional veri-
fication beyond the use of a third-party certification or inspection,
producers employing the use of such a third-party system would be
in compliance with any legislation likely to be passed in order to
govern the labeling of rBST-free dairy products. In order to reduce
retailer liability and to ensure properly labeled dairy products, the
use of a third-party examination system could be explored to verify
production practices employed by individual dairy producers.
Part I outlines the FDA's position on the labeling of rBST in the
use of milk production. Part II evaluates the movement through
market systems towards supplies of rBST-free milk. Part III investi-
gates the potential liabilities and damages associated with misrepre-
sentation of milk production practices as may be incurred by pro-
ducers, milk marketing cooperatives and retailers. Part IV evaluates
the incentives to verify the lack of rBST use in the current system.
Part V evaluates possible solutions, including market-based and leg-
islatively imposed solutions, for dealing with the verification of
rBST-related labels.
15. Press Release, The Kroger Co., Kroger to Complete Transition to Certified
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I. FDA POSITION ON RBST LABELING
The FDA did not recognize a significant difference between
milk from rBST-treated and untreated cows, leading it to conclude
that it did not have the authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, to require special labeling for milk from rBST-treated
cows." In February 1994, the FDA offered interim guidance on the
labeling of milk from untreated cows 7 in response to industry and
consumer representatives having requested guidance from the FDA
on this labeling issue.'8 The FDA agreed that the issuance of guid-
ance would help prevent false or misleading claims regarding rBST
use following the expiration of the congressional moratorium on the
commercial sale of rBST on February 3, 1994.'" The FDA stated that
due to the presence of natural bST in milk that such labeling state-
ments as "bST-free" would be false" and could imply a composi-
tional difference in the milk from cows treated with rBST versus
those not treated with rBST rather than a difference in production
methods.' The FDA recommends inclusion of the statement "from
cows not treated with rBST" or a similar statement2 and that mis-
leading implications with such statements could be avoided by put-
ting the statement in proper context, which could be achieved
through the addition of accompanying statements such as "[n]o sig-
nificant difference has been shown between milk derived from
1123rBST-treated and non-rBST-treated cows.
In the interim guidelines for labeling of milk from cows not
treated with rBST, the FDA stated that naturally occurring BST and
rBST could not be analytically identified in milk and that there were
not any measurable compositional differences between treated and
untreated cows. 2 ' Records to substantiate labeling claims were rec-
ommended, as the failure to maintain such records would make de-
16. Interim Guidance, supra note 1, at 6280.
17. Id. at 6279
18. Id.
19. Id. at 6280.
20. Id.
21. See Interim Guidance, supra note 1, at 6280. The FDA implies that it sup-
ports the labeling of milk having been produced under certain production practices
or methods. See id. Therefore, the intent of labeling is to identify the milk from
cows which was produced under certain production methods rather than to convey
differences in composition or quality in the milk or dairy products. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Interim Guidance, supra note 1, at 6280.
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fense of such labeling claims difficult if challenged. 5 A particular
example was given in the FDA recommendation, namely a dairy co-
operative that only processed milk from untreated cows, in which
the statement was made that "[s]tates may decide that affidavits26
from individual farmers and processors are adequate to document
that milk or milk products received by the firm were from untreated
cows." 7 While the FDA has offered guidance to processors and re-
tailers in the labeling of dairy products made from the milk of cows
not treated with rBST, individual states clearly retain control over
such labeling.
II. MARKET MOVEMENTS TOWARDS RBST-FREE MILK SUPPLIES
A well-functioning market allows consumers to signal to pro-
ducers what they desire and are willing to pay for. Through market
channels changing consumer tastes and preferences are communi-
cated to suppliers through changes in their demand. Changes in
policies and production practices by food producers have been in-
creasingly driven by consumer demand rather than governed by
changing regulations.28 The growth in "politics by other means -
politics practiced through the market" has allowed interest groups
to pursue political objectives through the market system rather than
through the more traditional legislative channels." Recently there
has been movement by retailers toward securing rBST-free milk
supplies in response to trends in consumer preferences and de-
mand. ° As retailers react to changing consumer tastes and prefer-
25. Id.
26. Cooperatives provide producers a standard form "affidavit" to sign. TJ.
Centner & K.W. Lathrop, Legislative and Legal Restrictions on Labeling Information
Regarding the use of Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 80 J. DAIRY Sci. 215, 216
(1997). The cooperative offers the possibility of premiums and requires that the
producer foregoes the use of rBST. The form is in actuality a contract, rather than
an affidavit (an affidavit is a signed, sworn statement that is notarized, and can lead
to perjury penalties for violations. The rBST forms do not require any oath or
notarization.). The contract is accepted when the producer signs. For this article,
the documents will be referred to as contracts, rather than affidavits, in order to
more properly characterize the purpose of the documents.
27. See Interim Guidance, supra note 1, at 6280.
28. See Schweikhardt & Browne, supra note 11, at 304, 311.
29. Id. at 305.
30. Kyle Kennedy, Florida Heading Toward being rBST-Free: Producers Dropping
Production-Increasing Hormone, THE LEDGER, (Lakeland, FL), June 10, 2007, available
at http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_5630.cfm. [hereinafter Or-
ganic Consumers]
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ences, dairy producers must alter production practices in order to
continue to serve the market. In short, retailers react to serve cus-
tomer demands for food produced under specific production prac-
tices and in turn individual food producers, hence dairy farmers,
must then adjust their production practices to fulfill the demand of
their customer - namely the retailer. In this way, politics practiced
through the market" have led dairy producers to move away from
the use of rBST although no regulation or legal action has been
taken to eliminate the use of the technology.
The market to provide fluid milk is comprised of individual
dairy producers, cooperatives that participate in the marketing and
transportation of milk, fluid milk processors, retailers such as su-
permarkets and convenience stores, and consumers who ultimately
make milk purchasing decisions. In order to provide fluid milk
produced without rBST to the consumer, adjustments to milk pro-
duction, handling, procurement, processing, and possibly even mar-
keting, must be made throughout the entire milk supply chain.
A. Retailer Response to Consumer Demand
Perhaps the most influential move by a retailer towards rBST-
free milk in Michigan was the announcement by Kroger on August
1, 2007 that it would "complete the transition of the milk that it
processes and sells to a certified rBST-free supply by February
2008." Further, by February 2008, the milk that Kroger processed
and sold in stores in Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, was to be certified as rBST-
free.33 Kroger's senior vice president and president of manufactur-
ing said the following in relation to Kroger's decision to secure
rBST-free milk: "[o]ur customers' increasing interest in their health
As retailers begin to respond to consumer demand by making rBST-free milk avail-
able, other retailers follow suit in order to remain competitive. Once a retailer has
made the decision to provide rBST-free milk, due to logistical, transportation, and
processing coordination concerns, a given retailer would likely move towards pro-
curement of all rBST-free milk. See generally Christopher Wolf, Farm Decisions Re-
lated to rBST use in Michigan, 12 MICHIGAN DAIRY REVIEW 1, 1 (Oct. 2007), available
at https://ww.msu.edu/nmdr/voll2no4/Voll2no4.pdf. [hereinafter Wol].
31. Schweikhardt & Browne, supra note 11, at 304.
32. See Kroger Press Release, supra note 15.
33. Id. (Highlighting that the only apparent certification that the milk sold to
Kroger comes from cows not treated with rBST is through producer statements.
There does not appear to be a third party certification system in place). Id.
20081
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and wellness is the basis for our decision."' As Kroger's multi-state
process shows, the movement towards providing dairy products
which are made from milk produced from cows that were not
treated with rBST is not specific to Michigan.35 In fact, many retail-
ers that sell milk throughout the country are selling all or some of
their products as "rBST-free. '3
Meijer, Inc. (Meijer), a retailer with 182 stores in Michigan,
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky,37 has recently announced that
their Meijer-brand milk comes from cows not treated with rBST"
The Meijer group vice president has said, "[o]ur customers have
asked for a different choice in their milk, as many prefer it from
cows that have not been treated with artificial growth hormones.""
Meijer further states as the reason for their switch to milk from cows
not treated with rBST, "[w]e've researched the topic and have lis-
tened to our customers. This move is not a reaction to any health
concerns. It's a decision to give our customers what they want."4
According to the statement by Meijer, the move towards provision
of milk from cows not treated with rBST is driven by changing con-
sumer preferences, thereby illustrating the move by retailers to serve
a changing market. Beyond supermarkets and grocery stores, retail-
ers such as Starbucks are also moving towards the procurement of
34. Id.
35. Id. Likely, as retailers within a given region begin to offer rBST-free milk,
other retailers in the area may end up offering rBST-free milk by "default" because
in order to provide rBST-free milk to one retailer, entire production sectors will
need to be altered. This argument is similar to that employed by the cooperatives
in Michigan when seeking to fulfill the demand for rBST-free milk by Kroger,
wherein entire cooperatives moved towards rBST-free milk production. See gener-
ally Wolf, supra note 30, at 1-2.
36. The following, admittedly incomplete list, is a sampling of processors who
are reportedly completely rBST free: Publix, Kroger, California Dairies, Inc., Prairie
Farms Dairy, Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc., Stonyfield Farm, Inc., Michigan Milk
Producers Association, Wilcox Farms, Cloverland/Green Spring Dairy, Oakhurst
Dairy, BelGioioso Cheese Inc., Wawa Dairy, Oberweis Dairy Inc, Joseph Gallo
Farms, and Smith Dairy Products. See Organic Consumers, supra note 30. Addi-
tional processors throughout the nation offer a portion of their products as being
from cow not treated with rBST, a few of these processors are Dean Foods, Dairy
Farmers of America, HP Hood, Darigold, National Dairy Holdings, Safeway Daily
Group, Tillamook County Creamery Assoc. Id.
37. Meijer, Store Locator, http://www.meijer.com/custserv/store-locator.jsp
(last visited Aug. 19, 2008).
38. Meijer, Meijer Offers Milk Produced Without Artificial Growth Hormone,
http://www.meijer.com/content/contentjleftnav-manual.jsp?pageName=pr..meije
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rBST-free milk supplies. Starbucks is reportedly "[r]esponding to
consumer concerns about genetic engineering and food safety [and]
the company committed to making 100 percent of the milk supply
for its more than 5,600 American locations free" from rBST by the
end of 2007.'
Retailers wishing to offer dairy products produced without the
use of rBST must secure milk supplies which are free from milk
from rBST-treated cows. According to FDA recommendations, the
milk from non-rBST herds should be kept separate from other milk
by physical segregation (which can be verified by records) through-
out transportation and processing and until the dairy product is in
its final package and appropriately labeled. 2 The FDA further clari-
fied that, although the physical separation and paper record trail is
not necessary due to any safety concerns about milk from cows
treated with rBST, it would be useful to defend against claims that
the milk labeling is false or misleading."
B. Milk Cooperatives Response to Retailer Demand
Cooperatives need to provide a certain amount of Class V fluid
milk, which fluctuates based on regional demand for fluid milk, in
order to qualify for the Federal Milk Marketing Order pool price."
Therefore, cooperatives must maintain adequate fluid milk contracts
with milk buyers in order to provide enough fluid milk to qualify.
Milk from cows treated with rBST will not qualify for Class I if re-
tailers are unwilling to purchase it for that market, 6 meaning that
41. Terri Coles, Monsanto's Bovine Growth Hormone Being Driven off the Market
(Sept. 2007), available at http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_
6974.cfm.
42. See Interim Guidance, supra note 1, at 6280.
43. Id.
44. See United States Dept of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., http://
www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Dairy/definitions.htm (explaining that there are 4
classes of milk in US Federal Milk Marketing Orders, namely Class I which is Grade
A milk used for beverage milk, Class II which is Grade A milk used in fluid cream
products, yogurt, ice cream, cottage, cheese, and other perishable manufactured
products, Class III which is Grade A milk used to produce cream cheese and hard
manufactured cheese, and Class IV which is Grade A milk used to produce butter
and milk in dried form). Id.
45. See Wolf, supra note 30, at 2 (pointing out that cooperatives have little choice
but to supply rBST-free milk if they want to continue to receive the higher "pool"
price).
46. Increased numbers of retailers are moving towards the sale of only rBST-free
milk, however, this does not preclude any retailer from selling fluid milk from cows
having been treated with rBST. Therefore, farmers and cooperatives may have a
20081
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the cooperative had to replace this milk with rBST-free milk in order
to fulfill fluid contracts."
Following Kroger's decision to supply rBST-free milk beginning
February 1, 2008, the cooperatives serving Kroger had to determine
how to fulfill Kroger's demand. 8 Cooperatives in Michigan selected
from a variety of ways to provide an rBST-free fluid milk supply to
Kroger." Cooperatives could have chosen to simply mandate that
their farms be rBST-free for the Michigan fluid milk supply." Alter-
natively, cooperatives could have decided that producers in the co-
operative who chose to continue to use rBST would receive the
Class III price rather than the uniform pool price for their milk."
This decision to pay only the Class III price for milk produced with
rBST, rather than the uniform pool price reflects the fact that the
cooperative would not be able to service the Class I fluid market
with that milk. A third option was cooperatives could determine
producers that chose to use rBST would receive the Class III price
and may also be forced to incur any increased transportation costs
in order to find a processing plant suitable for the milk.5 ' Therefore,
producer-members of such cooperatives choosiig to use rBST could
lose the quality, volume, and over-order premiums that they may
have otherwise received, in addition to potentially incurring in-
creased costs.
54
market for fluid milk from cows treated with rBST, however the size of such market
is likely to be small and is unpredictable overall. See generally Wolf, supra note 30, at
2 (noting that treated milk will be subject to increased hauling fees, implying that a
separate market may exist, while also stating that the amount of treated milk will
affect the prices obtained, making the market relatively unpredictable).
47. Id.
48. Id. (recognizing that it must be recognized that the cooperatives are re-
sponding to the demands of the retailers, whom are their customers. The retailers
are presumably fulfilling the demands of consumers. See supra Part II.A.





54. Wolf, supra note 44, at 2. Note that the total additional costs incurred by
producers choosing to use rBST will depend on the amount of milk being pro-
duced from cows supplemented with rBST versus cows not being supplemented
with rBST. Id. The ultimate determinant of additional costs, from added transpor-
tation costs, for example, will be the market dynamics at work at the time between
the amounts of rBST-free and rBST milk demanded and supplied in a given region.
Id. "Thus, the higher the quantity of milk produced with rBST, the larger the cost
and price penalty on that milk will likely be." Id.
[VOL. 4:177
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C. Individual Dairy Producer Decisions
At the heart of the rBST controversy, is the decision of the co-
operatives to impose consequences on member-producers choosing
to use rBST after January 1, 2008. Given the changing market dy-
namics in which dairy producers must now operate, individual farm
managers were forced to make decisions regarding how to react.
Individual producers can choose whether to sign the contracts and
produce rBST-free milk, sign the contracts and produce milk from
cows supplemented with rBST but sell the milk as rBST-free milk
through their cooperatives, thereby avoiding any lost revenue asso-
ciated with the production of rBST milk, or to produce milk from
cows supplemented with rBST and market the milk as such. Virtu-
ally all dairy producers with a given cooperative will choose to sign
the contract with the cooperative agreeing not to use rBST.55
III. PRODUCER LIABILITY
Dairy producers who sign contracts pledging not to use rBST,
and then in fact do use the hormone, subject themselves to several
risks. Under the terms of the contracts, they can be held liable for
monetary damages incurred by parties relying on the statements
averred. Additionally, a producer who signs and violates these con-
tracts opens himself up to criminal fines and prison sentences.
While it is not clear that a producer would be prosecuted, producers
should be cognizant of the risks they take by violating the contract.
A. Civil Liability
According to the terms of the agreement, a producer who uses
rBST will be liable for all resultant damages to parties relying on the
contract. The purchasing cooperative is clearly such a party, as are
grocery stores or supermarkets that purchase milk from the coop-
erative. The retailers are not intended beneficiaries under the con-
tract,5' but do rely on the contract when they pay a premium for
rBST-free milk. The retailers rely on the averments of the produc-
ers in determining what milk qualifies as rBST-free. As a result, the
55. See id.
56. The contract is written to benefit the cooperative and the producer. In the
absence of contract terms to the contrary, if a retailer paid a premium for rBST-free
milk, but actually received rBST-treated milk from the cooperative, its remedy
would be to sue the cooperative.
2008]
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producer is liable for damages to the retailers because he has agreed
to increase his exposure to liability.
7
Costs that would presumably be incurred by the retailer at the
supermarket level, if milk is mislabeled, include the costs associated
with removal of milk from the store shelves, costs of replacing the
milk removed from store shelves with new product,8 and costs asso-
ciated with loss of consumer goodwill. Presumably, retailers would
be unable to label, as coming from cows not treated with rBST, any
milk mixed with milk that was found to be from cows treated with
rBST. ° Mixing of milk from multiple sources, including multiple
cooperatives, could occur when picking up milk from the farm for
transport, placing milk into storage at the processing plant, during
processing itself, or even during packaging. Given the number of
opportunities for mixing milk in transporting and processing, a re-
tailer could end up with a substantial volume of milk that could not
be labeled as coming from cows not treated with rBST."' The coop-
erative would incur costs associated with milk in its possession that it
is now unable to use to fulfill fluid contracts because it has come
57. Even without such an agreement, the end results are similar. If a coopera-
tive paid a judgment to a retailer, the cooperative would then have damages and the
producer would again be liable.
58. There would likely be costs associated with the time in which milk was un-
available for purchase because the retailer was involved in procurement of suitable
replacement product, although such costs are difficult to quantify a priori.
59. A retailer who is found to be selling mislabeled milk would incur losses in
consumer goodwill, although such losses are difficult to quantify and would likely
be case-specific.
60. Symposium, Drug Residue Avoidance: The Issue of Testing, 79 J. DAIRY Sci.
1065, 1065 (1996) (inferring that any milk that had been mixed with milk that had
come from cows treated with rBST would be considered contaminated. For exam-
ple, in the case of antibiotic contamination any milk that is determined to be posi-
tive is dumped, which results in costs for the producer found to have contaminated
the milk and the industry as whole because contaminated portions of a tanker load
of milk must be discarded). Id. Given that milk is a fluid, physical separation would
be necessary to prevent cross-contamination. It follows that any milk which had
come into contact with milk from cows treated with rBST is contaminated and can-
not be labeled as having come from untreated cows. Id.
61. Id. Presumably, upon discovery that a farm had shipped milk from treated
cows as though it were milk from untreated cows, any milk that had been in contact
with that milk at any point in transport or in the processing plant would be ren-
dered unusable for fluid milk by the retailer who had previously proclaimed that
their fluid milk was from cows not treated with rBST. See Wolf, supra note 30, at 2.
The retailer who had found that their milk was unusable to sell as their own fluid
milk would have to mitigate damages in by finding another use for that milk. Id.
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into contact with milk from cows having been treated with rBST,
and for which it would need to find another use .
While the potential damages cooperatives and retailers face are
substantial, producers may also face liability to consumers. Even
though the FDA has determined that there is no compositional dif-
ference to the milk, it is possible for consumers to sustain damages.
For instance, if a producer is found to be providing milk from rBST-
treated cows, and the end product is mislabeled, a consumer (or
more likely, many consumers in a class-action) can Show damages in
the amount of the premium paid over "regular" milk. Despite a
small sum for an individual producer, a class action suit claiming
potentially large damages would be possible.
B. Criminal Liability
While milk producers face civil liability, they may also be ex-
posed to criminal liability. Michigan producers face prosecution
under two separate statutes. Violations of either statute could result
in fines or jail, and some producers may even commit crimes serious
enough to result in a prison sentence.
1. Record Keeping Crimes
The first relevant statute focuses on record-keeping, and makes
it a misdemeanor to commit or attempt any fraudulent or dishonest
practice in connection with keeping records." Producers found to be
using rBST, but with contrary records, could likely be charged under
this statute. This statute is particularly dangerous for unsuspecting
producers who want to hide any use of rBST. If producers alter or
omit information relating to the use of rBST in the herd, in order to
hide rBST use, they have likely violated the statute. In fact, because
the statute is expansively worded, prohibiting "any fraudulent or dis-
honest practice," a producer might violate the law through financial
62. See generally id. Another use would be found for the milk, which may have
come into contact with milk from cows treated with rBST, although it is likely that
the next best use would provide less value than use in the fluid milk market. Id.
(noting that treated milk receives Class III prices, and that producers will incur the
costs of finding a market for the treated milk).
63. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.295 (2004). In full, the statute reads, "[a]ny
person who connives at, commits, or attempts to commit any fraudulent or dishon-
est practice in connection with the making of official or semiofficial records of milk
and butter fat production of cows, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by im-
prisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00." Id.
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records as well." For example, if a producer pays for rBST with a
check, and notes that the payment is for Roundup@, another Mon-
santo product, he has again violated the statute. While the monetary
penalty for a violation is relatively small, each violation could result
in a fine, and some producers could even face jail time.5
2. False Pretenses
The second statute that could be used against producers who
violate their contracts has potentially more serious penalties. If a
producer signs the contract, knowing that he will later violate it, and
then receives a premium for rBST-free milk, he has committed false
pretenses.' The penalty for false pretenses is graduated, based on
the value conferred by the false pretense. At the lowest end, the
penalty is up to three months in jail and/or a fine, the greater of
$500 or 3 times the value, 7 but at the high end the penalty can be a
fine the greater of $15,000 or 3 times the value received and/or 10
years in prison. To merit such a severe penalty, the producer must
receive $20,000 in premiums for the rBST-free milk."9 Financial re-
cords could show when rBST purchases began, leading to estimates
about the value gained from the deception.
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Na-
tional Agricultural Statistics Service report that daily dairy cow milk
production in Michigan in December 2007 was 60.3 pounds of milk
per day.0 There exists a range of reported responses to rBST sup-
plementation with regards to the expected milk production in-
creases.7 1 Further, there are both reported values for increased milk
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.218 (2004). If a person uses a false pretense
to obtain from a person any money or personal property, he has committed the
crime. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.218(1)(c).
67. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.218(2).
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.218(5).
69. Id. Only money that was paid as a premium for rBST-free milk counts to-
wards this $20,000. However, if the buyer's policy is to only deal with rBST-
producers, then all money the producer receives is based on the misrepresentation,
and would count towards the $20,000.
70. See Press Release, United States Dept. Agric., Nat'l Agric. Statistical Serv.,
December Milk Production, available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics-
by-State/Michigan/Publications/CurrentNewsRelease/nr0807.txt
71. LOVELL S. JARVIs, THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF Two NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES ON
THE WORLD DAMRY INDUSTRY 8-9 (1996) (reporting that over numerous experimental
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production in absolute pounds of milk per day and in percentage of
total milk production terms. Monsanto claims that using rBST can
increase milk yield by ten pounds per cow per day through their
"Make 10" campaign, making the statement that "By adding
POSILAC® to your dairy management program, you can increase
milk production by an average of 10 pounds per supplemented cow
per day. '72 Cornell University reports through their bST fact sheet
that a 10% increase in milk production can be expected with rBST
73use.
Assuming a response of 10 pounds per day of additional milk
with rBST use, the average cow being treated with rBST would then
produce 70.3 pounds of milk per day. If, for example, the premium
for rBST-free milk is $0.75 per hundred pounds of milk, the pre-
mium paid per day per cow is $0.53. If a producer milks 100 rBST-
treated cows per day, it takes over a year to reach the $20,000
threshold.7 ' However, the next-lowest penalty, which is up to 5 years
in prison and a $60,000 fine, can be triggered at only $1,000 in
fraudulently received premiums.75 With the same 100 rBST-treated
cows, it now takes roughly three weeks to earn $1,000 in premiums.
Even with smaller herds, it would not take very long for a producer
to reach the $1,000 threshold, and therefore be guilty of a felony.
There are additional misdemeanor grades of false pretenses for in-
trials rBST was found to increase milk yield by 2.5% to 30% depending on man-
agement). Id.
72. Monsato Company, Making 10 Could Make a Real Difference,
http://www.makelO.net/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2008).
73. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Center for Food Safety and Ap-
plied Nutrition, Cornell University-bST Fact Sheet (June 6, 1995),
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/%7Eear/CORBST.html. (last visited Aug. 20, 2008).
74. A milking herd of 100 rBST-treated cows is assumed to simplify computa-
tions. Under typical management conditions milking herds will not consist solely of
animals treated with the hormone. See generally L.J. Butter, The Profitability of rBST
on U.S. Dairy Farms, 2 AG. BIo FORUM 111 (1999), available at
http://www.agbioforum.org/v2n2/v2n2a08-butler.htm. As the herd makeup
changes, so will the percentage of cows giving 70.3 pounds of milk per day, as op-
posed to the MI average of 60.3 pounds. With the lower production number, it
simply takes longer to reach the threshold for each level of false pretenses. How-
ever, for purposes of false pretenses, the premium paid on all milk is obtained
fraudulently-not just the premium paid for milk coming from actually treated cows.
The misrepresentation is that the entire milking herd is rBST-free, and the premium
is therefore paid for all milk.
75. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.218(4). The fine amount is the greater of
$10,000 or three times the amount obtained through the false pretenses, making
$60,000 the largest fine possible at this level. Id.
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stances where the producer gained only limited benefits, but the
biggest jump in penalties occurs at the $1,000 mark.6
False pretenses may be difficult to prove, as prosecutors must
show that the producer intended to defraud the buyer when the
contract was signed." This can be difficult if the producer ships
milk for a lengthy period before the rBST use is discovered. A pro-
ducer could conceivably claim that he started using rBST only re-
cently, and that when he signed the contract he intended to fulfill
the terms of the contract.7 1 Claims regarding rBST use by individual
dairy producers should be carefully scrutinized and are likely de-
pendent on the information which the producer has at the time the
decision to use or not use rBST is made, and on the perceived prob-
ability of detection of rBST use and perceived probable conse-
71quences.
Producers who use rBST in contravention of their contracts are
subjected to criminal liability through two statutes, which act in con-
cert to subject them to a high level of risk of breaking the law. Such
a producer cannot openly admit to using rBST, or face liability un-
der the contract and possible prosecution for false pretenses. How-
ever, a producer also cannot alter herd production, veterinary, or
financial records in order to hide the purchase or use of rBST with-
out subjecting himself to criminal liability.' A producer using rBST
76. See MICH COMP. LAWS ANN, § 750.218.
77. Id. If the producer later affirms that he is not using rBST, this can also be the
basis for a conviction. Id. § 750.218(9).
78. While this may relieve a producer of the intent required for false pretenses,
he can still be liable for damages for breaking the contractual agreement. See supra
Part III.A., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.218 (2004).
79. Economic analysis of the producer as a rational economic actor would sug-
gest that given the extremely large consequences associated with being caught in
violation of the agreement that with perfect information that the producer would
not violate the agreement. Further, since consequences for violation of the agree-
ment could be catastrophic to the future of the farm business, even a very small
probability of being caught would be sufficient to prevent producers from violating
the agreement. This argument is further strengthened if the producer is a risk
averse agent. Given that economic analysis of the producer as a rational economic
actor would suggest producers do not violate the agreement under perfect informa-
tion scenarios, possible scenarios under which producers may act outside the pre-
dictions of such a model include informational asymmetries, the perception of "no
possibility of detection" or that it is impossible to be caught, or otherwise not un-
derstanding the consequences associated with violation of the agreement.
80. Of course, a prosecutor has discretion whether to bring these charges, and a
producer may not be charged. However, it is important for producers to be aware
of the risks they face by violating the contract. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §
750.218 (2004).
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faces liability no matter what action is taken, as long as the coopera-
tive which required the contract attempts to discover the rBST use.
IV. INCENTIVE TO TEST?
According to the contract, the cooperative may inspect a pro-
ducer's dairy in order to determine whether rBST is being used."'
The question, however, is whether the cooperative has anything to
gain by actually detecting farmers using rBST. In fact, no interested
party (producer, cooperative, or retailer) wants any producer to be
discovered violating the contract." Additionally, the FDA does not
test milk for rBST, and claims that no test can detect the synthetic
version of the hormone." If third-party testing is implemented, the
costs will likely be borne by the dairy producers themselves. ' How-
ever, the individual farmers and milk marketing cooperatives do not
want to incur costs of policing or testing if they do not have to. As
of yet, retailers are not requiring the implementation of testing.
A. Retailers
Retailers do not want any producers to be caught using rBST in
violation of the contract for two reasons. First, a retailer does not
want to be associated with mislabeled products. Particularly, a re-
tailer does not want the headache of dealing with mislabeled food
81. The contract refers to a producer/cooperative agreement that is on file with
the author.
82. Each individual producer clearly does not want to be caught using rBST
because of the liabilities discussed supra. Furthermore, because individual produc-
ers are owners of the cooperative in which they market milk it is also in each pro-
ducer's best interest that the cooperative itself not incur financial losses due to
other producers being caught using rBST.
83. Supra Part I.
84. If third party testing is implemented, the costs associated with the testing will
likely be borne by the cooperatives or producers themselves. See infra Part V.C.2.
In such cases, it can be hypothesized that a single third-party would certify all pro-
ducers with a given cooperative and be "hired" by that cooperative. In such a situa-
tion, the cooperative would incur the costs of testing and pass such costs along to
farmer members. Another situation can be imagined in which individual farmers
each seek third party certification on their own, in which case the farmers would
incur costs directly. Overall, whether indirectly through the cooperative or directly
by hiring a third party individually, farmers will ultimately pay for the third party
testing.
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that is tied to genetic engineering, a hot-button issue. 5 Even if a
retailer can collect from the producer or the cooperative for the
costs associated with replacing the mislabeled milk, it may suffer
large damages to its company's reputation and goodwill. These
reputation and goodwill damages can be difficult and costly to prove
because it may be difficult for a retailer to show that any loss of
goodwill was caused by mislabeled milk, and not some other
source. 6 Given these difficulties, there is a strong possibility that a
retailer will not be able to win a judgment for the actual value of the
loss of goodwill.
Second, like a cooperative, a retailer will be concerned that
some portion of a judgment will be uncollectible. Even if a retailer
wins a judgment against a producer, there is no guarantee that the
individual producer will have enough assets to satisfy the judg-
ment. 7 Retailers may incur heavy damages, but if the damages are
greater than the assets of the producer, the retailer may not be able
to fully recover the judgment. If a producer's use of rBST causes
the cooperative $100,000 in damages, but the producer only has
$50,000 in unsecured assets, the cooperative may have $50,000 in
uncollectible judgments.'
The nature of the milk-mixing process also means that a small
amount of milk from rBST-treated cows can cause large quantities
of milk to be considered as if it came from treated cows. Any one of
Michigan's 2,700 milk producers 9 may cause substantial damages,
regardless of how much milk they sell to the cooperative. While it is
of course speculative as to the amount of ajudgment a retailer could
receive, it is useful to note that while the mean level of Michigan
85. See generally Jen Soriano, Hot Button Issue: Genetically Modified Foods, MOTHER
JONES (Nov. 24, 1999), available at http://www.mojones.com/
wto/soriano2.html.
86. See, e.g., Agriculture Servs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057
(6th Cir. 1977) (holding that an award of goodwill damages to plaintiff cooperative
was clear error, when defendant seller breached expressed and implied warranties
and provided mislabeled plant seed, causing the cooperatives customers to lose
faith in the cooperative).
87. This is especially true for savy producers who create separate limited liabil-
ity entities in order to reduce overall liability.
88. Alternatively, the cooperative and a retailer may both have damages, leading
to a pro-rata distribution of the producer's assets. In this case, neither injured party
is completely happy.
89. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Nat'l Agricultural Statistics Service, Michigan Agricul-
tural Statistics 2006-2007 http://www.nass.usda.go/Statistics-by-State/Michigan/
Publications/AnnualStatisticalBulletin/statsO7/livestock.pdf.
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dairy producer assets is relatively high" a producer's assets include
many assets, such as land, buildings, and equipment, which are likely
to be encumbered by some security interest.' Since a retailer can-
not predict eventual damages or producer assets, it is clearly pre-
ferred if no producer is detected using rBST in the first place.
B. Cooperatives
According to the contract, 2 the cooperatives may authorize a
third-party to examine a producer's facilities and animals in order to
determine if rBST is being used. However, the cooperative does not
want any of its producers to be caught using the hormone for two
primary reasons. First, while the producer will be liable for any
damages the cooperative or the retailer sustains, the producer again
may not have sufficient assets to cover that damage. The co-
dependant relationship confers risk to the cooperative of rBST de-
tection.93
The second reason a cooperative does not want a producer to
be caught using rBST is based on retailer demands that all fluid milk
be rBST-free.94 If producers are discovered using rBST, the coop-
erative might be liable for any grocery store damages that the pro-
ducer cannot pay, but more importantly, the retailer might not be
willing to continue dealing with the cooperative, at least until more
stringent facility examinations are in place in order to reduce the
likelihood of rBST use. A cooperative does not want to risk con-
tracts with retailers, and again does not want to discover that its
producers are using rBST.
90. See Eric Wittenberg & Christopher Wolf, 2006 Michigan Daiy Farm Business
Analysis Summary, Michigan State University Department of Agricultural Economics
Staff Paper, at 16 (November, 2007). The mean at the end of 2006 was $1,565,241
for total farm assets. Id. This was comprised of $318,082 in current assets,
$720,583 in intermediate assets, and $526,576 in long-term assets. Id.
91. Id.
92. The contract refers to a producer/cooperative agreement that is on file with
the author.
93. The cooperative may be able to purchase insurance to cover this type of loss
(while producers cannot, because they would be insuring against something that
they themselves willfully control). However, such a policy would likely require
more stringent examinations in order to reduce the insurer's risk. In this case, any
discovered rBST use would raise insurance costs for the cooperative.
94. See Wolf, supra note 30 at 2.
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V. POSSIBLE MARKET OR LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
One disgruntled farm employee could be all that is needed to
bring intense public scrutiny to the current affidavit system and the
lack of independent verification. While this might be a risk that the
involved parties are currently willing to take, it is also worthwhile to
examine the alternatives. First, the legislature could get involved
and attempt to ban "rBST-free" labeling on the ground that it is mis-
leading. This solution is not optimal, however, because such a ban
might also include non-misleading labels, and the prohibition would
likely be challenged under Amestoy."5 Another option is to imple-
ment an independent third-party testing system. This system could
be modeled after the system used by the organics industry. While
this testing will impose additional costs on the parties that may not
be recouped, it may reduce the risks posed to the retailers and co-
operatives, and would also benefit the vast majority of producers
who are not using rBST. While virtually all-dairy producers who
agreed not to use rBST are likely fulfilling such contractual agree-
ments, a single violation could cause large damages to the coopera-
tive and retailers to whom the milk was sold. Such damages would
include loss of consumer confidence in dairy product labeling over-
all, financial losses for the producer, cooperative, and retailer, and
legal implications for the producer found to be in violation. For
these reasons, an independent third-party testing system could be
explored to lessen risk to all parties involved in the production and
sale of milk labeled as rBST-free.
A. Make No Changes to the Current System
The simplest alternative available regarding the use of rBST in
milk production is to keep the current system for production of
rBST-free milk in place. For the moment, this system imposes few
costs on the involved parties, and cooperatives and producers are
able to enjoy premiums on milk they certify as rBST-free. However,
as more retailers make the shift to rBST-free milk they will also face
the possibility of incurring damages from mislabeled milk.
95. See generally Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69-74 (2d. Cir.
1996).
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1. Producers and Cooperatives
At the current time, cooperatives in some states are able to en-
joy a premium from the retailers for agreeing to forego the use of
rBST. There is always a chance that producers could be discovered
using rBST,6 but such cases would almost certainly be due to pro-
ducers being unaware of all of the possible consequences, particu-
larly the criminal consequences, or due to producers having the
perception that there is zero probability of being detected in viola-
tion of the contract.
Of course, there are some producers who will not use rBST at
all, for a variety of reasons, and these producers will enjoy the pre-
mium with no personal risk.97 If current premiums and risk levels
are maintained, producers are likely to make a similar analysis, and
continue to use, or non-use, at similar levels. However, if the pre-
miums, perceived consequences, or perceived probabilities of being
detected in violation of the contract change, producers will have to
reevaluate their situations. Producers and cooperatives would like
the premiums for rBST-free milk to remain, and therefore prefer
the status quo to a reduction in premiums for rBST-free milk.
However, this is not likely, because retailers will not pay premiums
unless there is some concurrent benefit for selling rBST-free milk
and the benefits to selling rBST-free milk for a single retailer are
likely to decrease as increased numbers of retailers in a given area
offer rBST-free milk.
2. Retailers
Right now, retailers are paying a premium to cooperatives for
providing milk from producers who have promised not to use rBST.
As long as there is a competitive advantage or a net benefit 8 from
96. For instance, a disgruntled employee might leak the information that a farm
has used rBST. Any producer or distributor of rBST has a clear interest in keeping
its customers satisfied (and anonymous), but if a court order sought the records,
they might have little choice but to turn them over.
97. As owners of the cooperative, they may suffer some losses if the cooperative
loses money due to other producers being caught. However, on an individual level,
these non-using producers face no risk.
98. Competitive advantage means that retailers may be able to sell rBST-free
milk at a higher price. See generally Tom Webb, Parents Demand for Milk Free of Mon-
santo's Genetically Engineered Bovine Growth Changing Dynamics of Marketplace, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 23, 2006, available at http://www.organiccon-
sumers.org/articles/article_2847.cfm. However, retailers may also receive a good-
will benefit from being associated with foods not tied to genetic engineering. Even
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doing so, retailers are likely to consider offering a premium for
rBST-free milk. However, if the benefits to the retailers shrink, they
will not be willing to pay as high a premium, if any premium at all,
to cooperatives for rBST-free milk. This premium is not likely to
remain stable indefinitely as more retailers switch to rBST-free milk
in order to remain competitive."9 If all major retailers sell rBST-free
milk, none have a competitive advantage over the others based on
offering rBST-free milk. For instance, if 80% of the fluid milk in
Michigan is rBST-free, there is less incentive to pay cooperatives a
premium for it. There is also less benefit from making statements
such as "none of our milk comes from cows treated with rBST," be-
cause this does little to differentiate that retailer's product. No re-
tailer will want to maintain premiums when there is little extra bene-
fit of rBST-free milk, and therefore premiums paid to producers will
begin to shrink.
A second consideration must also be made regarding retailers.
As more retailers demand that fluid milk be rBST-free, they gain
more leverage as a group. Each individual retailer faces the risk that
its producers will be discovered using rBST. This risk does not
change based on how many retailers are selling rBST-free milk. The
risk for each individual retailer remains the same, but industry-wide,
if there are more retailers selling rBST-free milk, there are more
opportunities for milk to be mislabeled. Without a reliable third-
party testing system in place, a retailer cannot predict if it will inad-
vertently sell mislabeled milk. Therefore, each individual retailer
has an interest in reducing the likelihood that producers will be
caught using rBST. While one individual retailer might not have
sufficient power to demand effective third-party testing, if several
retailers work together to demand the change, they may be able to
do so.
As retailers react to consumers changing tastes and demands by
providing milk with particular production process attributes, con-
sumers are likely to continue the trend towards increased concern
for food production practices and methods.'°0 Because consumers
continue to exert pressure on retailers for food produced under
certain methods, retailers are presumed to continue to exert chang-
if rBST-free milk sells for the exact same price as "normal" milk, a retailer might
still be willing to pay the premium in order to be able to say "none of our milk
contains artificial hormones." Id. Intangible reasons such as this factor into net
benefits.
99. See supra note 35.
100. Supra Part II.A.
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ing demands on food producers. When the benefits of going rBST-
free fade, retailers will be more aware of the risks they face, and will
want to mitigate those risks to the extent possible whether that is
through requiring third-party testing or some other means. With
increased attention paid to production practices by consumers and
retailers alike, in order to mitigate some risk held by the retailer in
mislabeling practices, a necessity for verification of practices by a
party other than those with incentives to misrepresent practices may
evolve. Given the economic incentives for the retailers, marketing
cooperatives, and producers to label food as having been produced
under the practices desired by consumers, an outside party would
likely be necessary in order to validate such production practice
claims. For this reason, it appears that the "do nothing" solution
has a limited duration, at least from the perspective of the retailers.
At some point, the collective risk that retailers face may outweigh
the benefits gained, and the retailers may want to take steps to re-
duce their risk. Over the long term, retailers may not be satisfied
with a do nothing approach, although it is likely to be acceptable in
the short-run.
B. Legislative Action
The Michigan legislature may decide to step into the rBST la-
beling arena. Michigan would not be the first state to do so.' The
state might try to solve the problems surrounding rBST labeling by
simply prohibiting all rBST-related labeling. A full proscription,
however, is not likely to be upheld against challenges, as it contra-
dicts the FDA's own recommendation."2 A state may be able to ban
these labels, but it would likely have to do so for a reason other than
what the FDA considers material.' 3 Alternatively, it may consider a
somewhat more relaxed law; for instance, Indiana recently consid-
ered a bill to prohibit labels that were supported solely by a pro-
101. See Daniel Malloy, Pa. Dairy Label Rule Shelved, PITT. POST GAZETTE, Nov. 28,
2007, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07332/837268-85.stm Other
states, such as Pennsylvania and Indiana, have considered drafting legislation to
deal with rBST labeling. See H.B. 1300 (In. 2008).
102. Interim Guidance, supra note 1, at 6280.
103. See id. at 6281 (explaining that material factors include information regard-
ing the consequences of use on health and safety, and includes information that, if
it were not presented, would make the label as a whole misleading).
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ducer's affidavit.1"' A law such as this seeks to prevent false and mis-
leading labeling by requiring some independent verification that the
labels are true. It would allow rBST-related labels as long as some
other evidence supported them.
1. Complete Ban
Michigan could consider an outright ban on any rBST-related
labeling. States have the authority to regulate commercial speech,
but complete suppression of commercial speech must be linked to
substantial state interests, 5 and complete suppression of commer-
cial speech that is otherwise protected by the First Amendment l°' is
not permitted unless the ban is "no more extensive than necessary
to further the State's interest."1"7
Michigan does not have many substantial reasons to prevent the
labeling of milk production practices. One reason might be to keep
milk purchasers from being misled by rBST-related labeling, but it is
unclear why less information, rather than more, would be the ap-
propriate remedy. 8 The state has a stronger rationale when it
claims that it is acting in order to prevent confusion or deceptive
labeling.' 0 While the state has a substantial interest in preventing
this type of commercial speech, the regulations it enacts must be no
broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the confusing or de-
ceptive speech.1
104. See H.B. 1300, 115th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008) (amending the
state's misbranded food law, IC 15-2.1-2-29.7, to include the following in its defini-
tion of misbranded food:
(13) For dairy products, if the labeling contains a:
(A) compositional claim that cannot be confirmed through laboratory
analysis; or
(B) compositional or production-related claim that is supported solely by
sworn statements, affidavits, or testimonials).
105. Central Hudson Gas & Elec Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
569 (1980).
106. Id. at 566 (explaining that false or misleading commercial speech, or com-
mercial speech advocating illegal activities, is not entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection).
107. Id. at 569-70.
108. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) ("If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an
emergency can justify repression").
109. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988).
110. Id.
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A complete ban is not reasonably necessary to prevent mislead-
ing rBST labels, if the labels are used in context."' A state may not
absolutely prohibit potentially misleading commercial speech that
could be presented in a non-misleading way."2 Milk labelers may
provide the necessary context so that rBST-related labels are not
misleading. A complete ban of rBST-related labels would be too
broad, and would not hold up under a First Amendment challenge.
2. The Indiana Model
Indiana considered a bill to prohibit labeling based solely upon
a producer's affidavit. While Indiana did not pass the law, other
states may consider a similar path. This type of law is designed to
prevent a situation where milk from rBST-treated cows is sold as
rBST-free. It would encompass all labels for compositional claims
that cannot be confirmed by laboratory analysis, and all composi-
tional or production-related claims that are only supported by the
producer's statement, even those that mirrored the FDA recommen-
dations, whether or not the label was accurate. "3 In effect, the law
attempts to create a presumption that such labels are false or mis-
leading, and therefore not entitled to First Amendment protection.
In its Interim Guidance, the FDA acknowledged that rBST-
related labels might be false or misleading, and encouraged produc-
ers to keep records showing rBST was not being used, in order to
defend against circumstantial evidence that the hormone was being
used."' However, the proposed Indiana law goes an extra step, ef-
fectively lifting the state's burden of having to show speech is false
or misleading, and placing a burden on the advertiser to show that
the speech is in fact true."5 Without some sort of corroborating evi-
dence, any rBST-related label would be statutorily misleading."'
111. See Interim Guidance, supra note 1, at 6280.
112. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 488.
113. See supra Part I.
114. Interim Guidance, supra note 1, at 6280.
115. CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE 17508(b) (2008) (demonstrating a similar scheme used
in California, for prosecuting entities where a prosecutor may request evidence to
support an advertiser's claims, and the advertiser must comply). This section does
not apply to consumers. Id.
116. It is unclear whether courts would find this to be violating the judicial test
outlined in Central Hudson, where the first prong requires the court to determine if
the speech is misleading. See Central Hudson Gas &Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. It is
assumed that the legislature may create this "per se misleading" designation. If,
however, the law was struck down, the analysis, explained infra, would be to exam-
ine what solution the retailers push for once they grow weary of the risks associated
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However, as long as the label was not based only on a producer's
averment, the label avoids being considered per se misleading.
Under this type of law, corroborative evidence is required to
justify an rBST-related label. However, there simply are not cur-
rently many ways to provide evidence that milk did not come from a
cow treated with rBST. It may be true for some products that dif-
ferent production processes affect the composition of the final
product, but there is no recognized way to test the milk itself for
rBST. This lack of recognized test means that the production proc-
ess itself must be examined, in order for there to be any probative
evidence that an rBST label is correct. An independent third-party
would need to examine production facilities, financial records, and
other information in order to be able to verify that the cows really
were not treated with rBST.
If a state does pass a law similar to the one considered in Indi-
ana, it is effectively mandating a third-party verification system for
rBST labeling, precisely because there is no currently recognized
way to test the milk itself for rBST. If a legislature determines that a
producer's averment is insufficient grounds for the labels, only a
third-party examination of the production system and practices
would be able to determine whether or not there has been rBST
use. The law Indiana considered would simply force producers, co-
operatives, and retailers to devise a third-party system that provides
evidence rBST was not used.
C. Third-Party Examinations
An additional alternative for rBST-free verification is for the
parties to enact some form of third-party testing, whether simply in
response to market demand and without being forced to by legisla-
tive action or in response to a law such as the one considered in
Indiana. While a third-party testing or certification system would
impose costs upon the parties, it would also provide additional evi-
dence that milk was being properly labeled. Further, since third-
party verification of production practices would likely be the result
of regulations on rBST-labeling, producers willingly participating in
a third-party system are placing themselves in compliance of any
legal requirements, which they are likely to need to comply with in
the foreseeable future.
with the "do nothing" solution. The solution the retailers will likely demand is
identical to the one that the law would require.
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1. Emerging Markets for Third-Party Certification Agencies
A growth in "politics by other means - practiced through the
market""7 has clearly led to milk producers movement towards pro-
ducing rBST-free milk, and may lead to a need for verification of
such practices in the future. Increasing needs for verification of
production practices could arguably lead to a demand for third-party
verification agencies. As consumer groups have moved towards the
pursuit of political objectives through the market system rather than
through legislative channels," 8 perhaps the dairy industry itself could
move towards verification through the market system. It was
changes in consumer preferences and what production practice at-
tributes consumers were willing to pay for in the market that led to
movements towards the production of rBST-free milk in the first
place. A market system method of practice verification could be
third-party agencies hired to verify practices, thereby alleviating risk
to individual producers, cooperatives and milk marketers, and the
retailers. Through such a market-based verification system agencies
capable of verifying production practices would evolve to fulfill the
demand for such services by dairy producers and cooperatives.
Third-party verification of production practices surrounding
the use of rBST on daiiy farms is the best option facing the dairy
industry today for three main reasons. First, once dairy producers
and cooperatives begin to demand the service of third-party produc-
tion practice verifiers, verifying agencies will evolve to fulfill that
demand. In essence, the voluntary use of a third-party verification
system is the market solution to this rBST-use verification problem.
Second, as stated prior,"9 it is unlikely that legislation would force
producers to go beyond the use of a third-party verification system.
Producers choosing to voluntarily participate in the third-party veri-
fication system would be proactive in staying ahead of legislation,
which could possibly be enacted in the regulation of rBST labeling.
Third, the third-party verification system has been used in the verifi-
cation of production system attributes, some of which are also un-
able to be detected by testing the product itself, such as organic
production. The third-party verification system used in the certifica-
tion of organics, and in particular, in certifying organic milk produc-
tion could serve as a useful model for the development of a third-
party rBST verification system.
117. Schweikhardt & Browne, supra note 11, at 304.
118. Id. at 309, 310, 314, 315.
119. SupraPartV.B.
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Perhaps the closest existing potential framework for third-party
verification of rBST usage on dairy farmsis the USDA Process Veri-
fied Program."' The USDA states that, "[i]n light of the ever-
changing consumer, successful livestock producers must adapt their
production practices to consider consumers' lifestyles, preferences,
and taste. '21 To aid producers in verifying such production proc-
esses, the USDA offers a service by which a third-party verifies a
company's documented quality management program through au-
dits.'2 The USDA Process Verified Program uses the International
Organization for Standardization's ISO 9000 series standards for
documented quality management as their framework for ensuring
auditing practices through the evaluation of program documenta-
tion.'23 The USDA Process Verification Program is limited to those
programs in which the process verified points are identified by the
supplier and are supported by a documented quality management
system.'24 Currently verified points reported by the USDA include
age, source, feeding practices, or raising and processing claims.
Specifically, examples of claims associated with process verified
points given by the USDA and AMS are "grass (forage) fed, [n]ever-
ever claims such as [n]o antibiotics, [n]o [g]rowth [p]romotants
([h]ormones), and [n]o [a]nimal [b]y-products [a]dministered,
[b]reed.""'2 Because that raising and processing claims are currently
verified, specifically regarding the use of hormones, it is plausible
that a similar program could be developed for verification that cows
are not treated with rBST on a given dairy farm. 7 Companies with
120. See U.S. Dept. of Agric., Grading Certification and Verification, LS Process
Verified Program, http://processverified.usda.gov/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2008).
121. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA Process Verified:
Verification Services of the Livestock and Seed Program, http://www.ams.usda.gov/
AMSvl.o/getfile?dDoc.Name=STELPRDC5065676 (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
122. Id.
123. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, Grading, Certification,
and Verification, LS Process Verfied Program, http://processverified.usda.gov/ (last
visited Sept. 8, 2008).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA Process Verified:
Verfication Services of the Livestock and Seed Program, http://www.ams.usda.gov/
AMSvl.o/getfile?dDoc.Name=STELPRDC5065676 (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
127. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA Process Verified:
Never ever 3, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSul.0/getfile?DocName=STELPRDC
5066028 (last visited Sept. 8, 2008). It does not appear that this verification process
is currently being used for rBST-free claims.
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approved USDA Process Verified Programs are able to market
themselves as "USDA Process Verified".
According to the USDA, "verification programs ensure a system
is in place that requires you to 'do what you say you are doing'.'
29
Given the goals of the current USDA programs, which seek to pro-
vide third-party audits in order to verify that producers are using the
processes they indicate that they are in their labeling, the dairy in-
dustry could develop similar programs to verify that cows are not
treated with rBST.
2. Potential Costs of Third-Party Verification System
Whether a certification system is enacted voluntarily or im-
posed by a legislature, it is going to increase expenses for at least
one of the involved parties. The costs of a third-party system must
be evaluated to determine if the benefits of such a system are worth
the added expense.' ° It seems likely that the producers will be the
ones who bear the costs. Individual producers might have to pay a
testing agency, or perhaps the producer-owned cooperative could
negotiate with the agency to inspect all its producers, in order to
reduce transaction costs associated with having each individual pro-
ducer seek a third-party on their own. In either case, the producer
is paying the increased cost in order to become certified as not hav-
ing used rBST. A third-party verification system will reduce risks to
retailers, thereby making it in the retailers' best interest that they
buy milk from somehow certified producers. Currently, cooperatives
are receiving a premium for the milk they sell to retailers which is
rBST-free, although whether such premiums will continue is un-
known. It can not be predicted whether retailers would offer some
128. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, Grading, Certification,
and Verification, LS Process Verified Program, http://processverified.usda.gov/ (last
visited Sept. 8, 2008).
129. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA Process Verified:
Verification Services of the Livestock and Seed Program, http://www.arns.usda.gov/
AMSvl.o/getfile?dDoc.Name=STELPRDC5065676 (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
130. Id. The benefits of a third-party system are mostly intangible, in that they
reduce the risk of damaging the retailers' and the industry's reputation. There have
also been studies, which have found that the display of a USDA organic seal on milk
increased the probability of consumers purchasing milk. Kristin Kiesel & Sofia B.
Villas-Boas, Got Organic Milk? Consumer Valuations of Milk Labels after the Implementa-
tion of the USDA Organic Seal, 5J. AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG., Art. 4 (2007) available
at http://www.bepress.com/jafio/vol5/issl/art4. Further, it was found that con-
sumers valued the changes in the labeling regulations as put forth under the Na-
tional Organic Program. Id.
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form of payment or cost-sharing in order to initiate a third-party
verification system, although it is conceivable that some form of
premium would be offered to provide assistance, at least during the
initial switch to a third-party verification system.
While the actual costs of a third-party verification system for
rBST-free milk production are speculative, it is helpful to look at
testing costs for the organic industry, which uses an independent
third-party certification system. It should be noted, however, that
certification of dairy farms for organic production is very complex,
including inspection of organic feed for cattle in addition to cattle
management practices and overall farm management techniques
employed. Third-party certification for cows being managed with-
out the use of rBST would likely be much less complex than certifi-
cation for organic standards, and therefore costs associated with
certification can be expected to be significantly less. In the certifica-
tion of organics, either state Departments of Agriculture or private
entities act as certifiers."' A producer fills out a registration form
and pays a fee, and an inspector does a physical tour of the produc-
tion facilities to determine if the product meets the requirements
for organic."' Each certifying agency has its own cost structure for
organic certification, although estimates exist that the costs of main-
taining organic certification for most farms will be roughly $400 to
$1,000 annually. '33 Further, the cost to the producer may vary de-
pending on the size of the farm, as certifying agencies may charge a
fee based on the annual organic sales of the operation."' A survey
of 11 certification agencies operating in multiple states, yielded that
for first-time certification, the average cost to a small farm with
roughly 25 acres and $30,000 is annual sales was $579.35 A medium
farm, with 150 acres and $200,000 in annual sales paid an average of
$1414, while a 500-acre farm with $800,000 in sales paid $3,623.36
The largest farms, with 3,000 acres and $10,000,000 in sales paid an
131. James J. Ferguson, Organic Certification Procedures and Costs, HS971, May
2004, available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/HS208 [hereinafter Ferguson].
132. Id.
133. Jody Padgham & Harriet Behar, GUIDEBOOK FOR ORGANIC CERTIFICATION 5
(2007), available at http://www.mosesorganic.org/attachments/hwguidebook06.
pdf.
134. Id.
135. Ferguson, supra note 130.
136. Id.
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average of $33,276.37 Costs for subsequent years were roughly one
third less than for the first year that the farm was certified."'
If actual costs for implementing an rBST-free certification sys-
tem are at all similar to the certification of organic production,
smaller producers would be expected to pay a greater percentage of
their sales than larger ones in certification costs. Smaller producers
may therefore have economic incentives to resist a certification sys-
tem unless there is a cost-sharing device to help defray costs. In the
certification of organics, the United States Department of Agricul-
ture provides funds to reimburse producers 75% of the first year's
certification, up to $500.' This ambitious plan is possible because
of the relatively small number of organic farms nationally, but would
cost $1.3 million if used for cost-sharing with Michigan's 2,700 dairy
producers. If the cooperative negotiates with the certifying party, it
could negotiate rates with volume discounts that would allow mem-
bers to become certified at a lower cost than obtaining third-party
verification as individuals. Even if the cooperative was not able to
negotiate with the certifying party, it could set up its own rebate
plan, in order to help those producers with smaller sales volumes.
The costs associated with certifying a dairy producer as rBST-
free are not prohibitive, and are likely to be significantly less than
those for certification of organic production.4 ' It is likely that
smaller producers will pay a larger portion of their sales in order to
be certified, but the cooperative can take steps to alleviate this con-
cern. The cooperative is in a good position to do so, as it represents
only the interests of its members, and can craft some sort of cost-
sharing structure that satisfies its members. Because a third-party
testing system would reduce the risks to the parties, and will likely
satisfy any foreseeable changes in state legislation, and does so at a
manageable cost, it is the best alternative. When retailers realize the
shrinking benefits of going "rBST-free" are not worth the risk to
their reputations, they may start to demand change. The best
change retailers, and the dairy industry alike, can seek if such




140. The costs are likely to be higher in the first year of certification, but are ex-
pected to be subsequently lower, just as when organic certification is undertaken.
See Ferguson, supra note 130.
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CONCLUSION
An incident involving mislabeled milk would erode consumer
confidence in the dairy industry and in the retailers labeling such
milk as well. Further, as the market for rBST-free milk increases in
scale nationwide and there are increased numbers of retailers, co-
operatives, and producers involved, there may be increased poten-
tial for milk to be mislabeled. Retailers and the dairy industry alike
want to avoid the possibility of a mislabeling incident, therefore
verification could be explored as a potential method to mitigate
risks faced by retailers, cooperatives, and individual dairy producers.
Third-party certification of production practices used to produce
milk is the best option facing the dairy industry today if rBST label-
ing claims eventually must be validated, whether dictated by legisla-
tion or adopted due to market pressures.
